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PITFALLS IN THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY:
CONCERTINA REFORMS OF TARIFFS AND SUBSIDIES TO 
HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES
J. Peter Neary
Among the many difficulties of economic policy-making is the need to
understand the relevant economic theory.  In this paper I want to illustrate
the delicate and subtle steps from theory to policy advice by means of
some examples from recent work in international trade.  To set the scene,
let me start with three policy questions:
1. What kinds of tariff change will raise welfare in a small open
economy?
2. Should countries liberalise trade unilaterally or only multilaterally?
3. Should export-oriented high-technology firms be subsidised?
I think it is self-evident that these questions are important and interesting.
They arise in many real-world contexts and non-economists care about
the answers.  By contrast, consider the following three theoretical
questions:
1. Should models of tariff reform contain a numeraire good?
2. How many distinct theorems of tariff reform are there? 
3. What should we assume about the relative commitment powers of
governments and firms?
Clearly, these are not questions which would ever occur to a non-
economist.  I suspect that even many economists would find them dry and
uninteresting.  Their focus on the literature rather than on the real world
suggests that only specialists, and pedantic ones at that, are likely to care
about the answers.
Yet, as I hope to show, the answers to the three theoretical questions
above are intimately bound up with the answers which our current
knowledge allows us to offer to the three policy questions.  Moreover, I
believe that misunderstandings of the theoretical subtleties involved have
2led some economists to give misleading, if not downright wrong, policy
recommendations.  I say ‘misunderstandings’ rather than ‘errors’ because
as a profession we are well trained in rooting out analytic mistakes and
there are none such in the literature I review below.  However, we may be
less sensitised to appreciating the qualifications which need to be made
in applying theoretical results.  I illustrate this point in each of the
following three sections by highlighting statements in the literature which
are at best redundant and at worst highly questionable.  
1. TARIFF REFORM IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY
The first topic I consider is that of tariff reform in a perfectly competitive
economy which cannot influence its external prices.  The main results in
this area are well-known since the work of Hatta (1977) and others.  In
the absence of externalities or ‘non-economic’ motives for protection,
such a small open economy should not restrict trade.  Moreover, with
given initial tariffs there are two types of change which are guaranteed to
raise welfare.  One is a uniform radial reduction of tariffs; the other is a
‘concertina’ reform, which compresses the tariff structure.  The concertina
reform rule is subject to a well-known qualification: to guarantee a
welfare improvement, any good whose tariff is altered must be a net
substitute for all other goods.  Nevertheless, it is widely advocated in
practice and is often used by the World Bank and others to justify tariff
reforms which reduce the variance of the tariff structure, lowering
exceptionally high and (especially if the reform is required to be revenue-
neutral) raising exceptionally low tariffs.
Exactly how well-founded in theory are these policy
recommendations?  To examine this I need to review the theory of tariff
reform.  Before doing so, I want to note three results which have been
derived in the literature in models without a numeraire good.  These
results are correct as stated but I will argue later that they are not very
helpful in policy contexts.  So, I label them ‘POMPs’ for ‘Potentially
Misleading Propositions’!  They are:
3POMP 1: (Diewert, Turunen-Red and Woodland (1989))  A tariff
change of the form dt=dp*!et, d+e>0, must raise welfare.
Here t  and p* are vectors of specific tariffs and world prices of all goods
(including the numeraire) while d and e are scalars.  Hence POMP 1 states
that welfare will rise if tariffs are increased in proportion to world prices
or decreased in proportion to their initial levels.
POMP 2: (Diewert et al (1989))  There always exists some increase in
tariffs which will raise welfare.
This is really a corollary of POMP 1, with e set equal to zero, so the tariff
change takes the form dt=dp*>0.
POMP 3: (Hatta (1977) Fukushima and Hatta (1989))  An increase in
the lowest tariff rate will raise welfare, provided the good in
question is a net substitute for all other goods.
This completes my list of POMPs.  In order to substantiate my criticisms
of them, I need first to present the basic theory of tariff reform.1
1.1  Tariff Reform in a Small Open Economy with no Numeraire
Good
I consider a small open economy which consumes and produces n+1
goods which it trades at fixed world prices.  For the present, I will assume
that there is a numeraire good and denote by p and p* the n-by-one
vectors of the domestic and world prices of non-numeraire goods
respectively.  It turns out to be very convenient to summarise the
behaviour of consumers and firms in terms of a single function.  Following
Neary and Schweinberger (1986) I call this the trade expenditure
function, defined as the difference between consumer spending and GNP.
These in turn are equal to standard expenditure and GNP functions
4E(p,u) / e(p,u) & g(p) (1)
Ep(p,u) ' ep(p,u) & gp(p) ' m(p,u) (2)
p ' p ( % t (3)
E (p ,u) ' t )m (4)
respectively:
This function embodies a number of assumptions: consumer spending is
the outcome of a single utility-maximising individual’s decisions; and all
goods and factor markets are perfectly competitive with no barriers to
efficient intersectoral factor movements.  These assumptions are standard
but still heroic. They can be justified as allowing a clear focus on the
contribution of trade policy to efficiency.  The great convenience of the
trade expenditure function is that its price derivatives equal the economy’s
compensated net import demand functions: 
(This follows because, by Shephard’s and Hotelling’s Lemmas, ep and gp
equal the economy’s consumption and output vectors, respectively.)
Moreover, these import demand functions are well-behaved: the
substitution matrix S / !Epp = !mp may be assumed to be positive
definite.2  Finally, the utility derivatives of the trade expenditure function
equal those of the household expenditure function.  Thus, Eu = eu, the
marginal cost of utility, which it is convenient to normalise to equal one
initially; and Epu/Eu = xI, the vector of Marshallian income derivatives.
We are now ready to summarise the equilibrium of a tariff-distorted
small open economy.  First, domestic prices equal world prices plus tariffs
(by definition there is no tariff on the numeraire good ‘0’, so p0=p*0 =1):
Second, since all tariff revenue is redistributed costlessly, it equals net
spending by the private sector:
where a prime denotes the transpose of a vector or matrix and where net
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imports equal excess demand, from (2).  Totally differentiating these
equations we obtain the basic expression for the welfare effects of tariff
changes in a small open economy:
The coefficient of welfare change on the left-hand side may reasonably be
assumed to be positive.3  Hence our concern is with the right-hand side of
(5).
The uniform reduction result follows immediately.  Since S is
positive definite, a tariff change of the form dt = !et, e>0, must raise
welfare.  However, the more difficult question is what can be said when
tariff changes are not equi-proportionate.  This is where the concertina
rule comes in.
To derive the concertina reform result, disaggregate the tariff vector
into t1 (a scalar) and t2 ; and assume that t2 is fixed.  Partitioning the S
matrix conformably into its sub-matrices allows (5) to be written as:
Now, switch to ad valorem tariffs, ri = ti /pi, and make use of the linear
homogeneity of E in all prices (p0 ,p):
Transposing and rearranging, this can be written as:
Hence the key equation becomes:
6(1 & t )xI )du ' & (r1 & S
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1
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Note that the summation is over all goods except good 1 but including
the numeraire; and that from (9) the weights sum to unity:  ? i1  =  !piSi1
/ p1S11, i = 0,2,3, ..., n, S ? i1= 1.  Thus, if the tariff on good 1 is reduced
(dt1<0), the right-hand side of (10) is positive provided the tariff rate on
good 1 exceeds a weighted average of the tariff rates on all other goods
(including the zero ‘tariff’ on the numeraire).  This is where
substitutability comes in.  The expression in (10) is not a true weighted
average unless all the weights are positive.  This in turn requires that good
1 be a general equilibrium net substitute for every other good: ? i1 >0 if
and only if Si1 <0.  Hence we finally reach our statement of the concertina
rule:
Proposition 1 (The Concertina Rule): If good 1 has the highest tariff rate,
a sufficient condition for a reduction in r1 to raise welfare is that
good 1 is a net substitute for all other goods.
Note that the requirement that good 1 be a net substitute for all other
goods is an over-strong sufficient condition. All that is required is that r1
> S ? i1ri.  For example, complementarities per se (some ? i1 <0) are not
a problem.  Lowering the highest tariff can only reduce welfare if the good
in question is a sufficiently strong complement for some goods that it is
also strongly substitutable for some other goods which are subject to high
tariffs.
1.2 Tariff Reform in a Small Open Economy without a Numeraire
Having reviewed the theory of tariff reform in models with a numeraire,
let me now follow the same route in a model which treats all goods
symmetrically.  This cannot change the substantive results, of course.
7p ' p( % t , p ' {p0 ,p} ; p
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However, it can open the way to misunderstandings.
Since the model is unchanged, its specification is as before, except
that I use Greek letters to denote (n+1)-by-one vectors which include the
numeraire good.  Thus, parallelling equations (2) to (4), domestic prices
equal world prices plus tariffs:
net spending at world prices is zero:
and excess demand equals net imports:
Totally differentiating yields a slightly different version of equation (5):
where XI is the (n+1)-by-one vector of income derivatives of demand for
all goods and Spp is the (n+1)-by-(n+1) matrix of price responses and is
positive semi-definite.  As before, we assume that the coefficient of du,
p*.XI  is positive,4 so the efficacy of tariff reform hinges on the right-hand
side term.
1.3 Why ‘POMPs’ are POM
We are now ready to see why the theorems I presented at the outset may
be described as ‘potentially misleading’.  Consider first what equation
(14) says about the effects of uniform reductions in tariffs.  Since the
excess demand functions are homogeneous of degree one in the vector of
8all prices p, we have pNSpp=0.  Hence, from (11), the right-hand side of
(14) becomes p*NSppdt = !tNSppdt .  Hence tariff reductions proportional
to initial tariff levels (dt=!et) must raise welfare.  But without any
manipulation of (11) it also follows that tariff increases proportional to
world prices also raise welfare.  This proves POMP 1.
But what exactly does this prove?  Consider a tariff reform of the
kind specified in the proposition: dt=dp*!et .  From (11) this is the same
as dt=dp!(d+e)t ; in words it is the same as raising all tariffs in proportion
to domestic prices and then lowering them, by a factor of d+e, in
proportion to their initial values.  The only difficulty with this is that,
since raising all tariffs in proportion to domestic prices does not change
relative prices, it cannot affect any real magnitudes.  In particular it has no
effect on welfare!  All it amounts to is a rescaling of domestic prices; or
put differently, to a change in the numeraire.  Hence, the tariff change
dt=dp*!et  is equivalent to a proportional reduction of tariffs of (d+e)%,
no more and no less.
The same argument applies to POMP 2.  It is technically true that
welfare will increase if all tariffs are increased in proportion to world
prices.  But such a tariff change (of the same form as before with d>0 and
e=0) is really a uniform tariff reduction of d%.
Finally, what about POMP 3?  There is no need to prove the
concertina rule a second time, since the proof already given makes explicit
the role of all n+1 goods.  Equation (10) also shows that welfare will
definitely rise if the tariff rate on good 1 is lower than that on all other
goods and good 1 is a net substitute for all of them.  However, allowing
for a numeraire good leads to a fundamental reinterpretation of this result.
By construction, the tariff on the numeraire good itself is zero.  Hence,
with a numeraire, the lowest tariff is either zero, when it is equal to the
tariff on the numeraire itself, or negative, when it amounts to an import
subsidy.  If the latter, ‘raising’ the lowest tariff really means reducing a
distortion, since the subsidy rate is moved closer to zero.  If the former,
raising the tariff on the numeraire (which means that it ceases to be a
numeraire) is equivalent from homogeneity to lowering tariffs on all other
goods.  In this case, POMP 3 (like POMPs 1 and 2) is really just a
9restatement of the uniform reduction rule.
In conclusion, I should stress that the papers where these
propositions originate make many important contributions other than the
ones which I have criticised.5  However, I believe that propositions of this
sort have done potential harm in appearing to provide a case for tariff
increases in distorted small open economies.  For example, the World
Bank appears to have implemented this advice in many of the structural
assistance packages which it has implemented in sub-Saharan Africa.
There may be, of course,  other reasons why raising some tariffs may be
desirable: the desire to avoid a loss of tariff revenue is one possibility.6
However, to the extent that the models I have surveyed here are relevant,
they do not imply that there is a case for raising tariffs.  In the real world,
the conditions for the concertina theorem to apply are unlikely to hold in
the case where low (but positive) tariffs are raised, since there are
typically many goods (such as exports) with zero or even negative trade
distortions.
2. UNILATERAL VERSUS MULTILATERAL REFORM OF
TRADE POLICY 
The second area I want to review is that of tariff changes in the world as
a whole.  Here I want to suggest, not that there are misleading results in
the literature, but rather that the fundamental similarity between a number
of different results has not been appreciated.  These results I therefore
label ‘ARTs’ for ‘Arguably Redundant Theorems’.  Consider the
following:
ART 1: Proportional reductions in tariffs raise welfare in a small open
economy.
ART 2: Given substitutability, concertina reforms of tariffs raise
welfare in a small open economy.
ART 3: Proportional reductions in tariffs by all countries are Pareto-
improving.
10
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ART 4: Given substitutability, concertina reforms of tariffs by all
countries are Pareto-improving.
ART 5: (Ohyama (1972), Kemp and Wan (1976)) If a group of
countries keeps its net external trade fixed, then a Pareto-
improving tariff reduction exists.
ARTs 1 and 2 repeat the two small-open-economy results considered in
Section 1.  I have already noted (as is well known) that they are both
special cases of the general expression for welfare-improving tariff
changes, (5).  ARTs 3 and 4, by contrast, relate to a very different
substantive question:  When will coordinated tariff changes by a group of
countries lead to a welfare improvement for all of them?  Finally, ART 5
deals with yet another problem, that of characterising the tariff changes
which will ensure a welfare improvement for a customs union.  The
Ohyama-Kemp-Wan theorem is one of the few clear-cut results in the
whole of customs union theory.
As in the last section, I first begin by sketching an analytic
framework.  Fortunately, much of the necessary work has already been
done.  Consider a world with many countries, indexed by j = 1, ... m,
each of which can be characterised in just the same way as the small open
economy of Section 1.  Thus in each country (indexed by a superscript j)
domestic prices equal world prices plus tariffs:
net domestic spending equals tariff revenue:
and net imports equal the derivatives of the trade expenditure function:
This gives 3m equations for the 3m country-specific endogenous variables,
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{uj}, {pj} and {mj}.  The specification of world equilibrium is completed
by adding the requirement that world markets must clear:
This last equation determines the remaining unknown, p*.
Solving the model in full is complicated.  Fortunately, we do not
need to do this, since all we seek are sufficient conditions for Pareto-
improving tariff changes.  First, differentiate (15) to (17) as in the small
open economy case, and then sum over all countries:
where the notation of Section 1 is extended to the multi-country case in
an obvious way.  (For example, Sj/!E jpp.)  Next, differentiate (18):
and use (17) to solve for the change in world prices dp*:
where S/SSk is the world substitution matrix.  Finally, substitute in (19)
and collect terms:
where:
This is similar to the small open economy case, as given by (5), except
that the ‘shadow premia’ T j (the differences between home and shadow
12
prices) 
are not the actual tariffs but their deviations from the worldwide weighted
average.  The weights are positive definite matrices and sum to the identity
matrix: S SkS-1  = I.
We can now state a single general result which encompasses all five
ARTs by means of an assumption and a theorem:
Assumption 1:  For every country, the term (1!T jNx jI)!1, which equals its
shadow price of foreign exchange evaluated at the shadow premia
Tj, is positive.
If Assumption 1 did not hold, it would be possible to obtain a Pareto
improvement by lump-sum redistributions of goods (transferring them
from countries with negative towards those with positive shadow prices
of foreign exchange).  I assume that lump-sum international transfers are
allowed, since otherwise the problem becomes the much more difficult
one of finding conditions for actual rather than merely potential Pareto
improvements.
Proposition 2:  Given Assumption 1, a necessary and sufficient condition
for a Pareto-improving tariff change is that the right-hand side of
(22) is positive.
Clearly the proposition follows immediately by inspection of (22).7
Proposition 2 is a powerful result.  It shows that, as far as efficiency
is concerned, international tariff harmonisation is always desirable.
Moreover, the number of countries which choose to harmonise their tariffs
does not matter.  It can be only a single country (as envisaged in ARTs 1
and 2) or all countries in the world (as envisaged in ARTs 3 and 4) or any
intermediate group of countries.  Note that, if all countries have identical
tariff structures, then no further Pareto gains are possible.  This is because
if the same relative prices prevail in all countries, the remaining common
tariffs are equivalent to lump-sum taxes and have no welfare cost.
It is straightforward to show that all five ARTs are corollaries of
13
Proposition 2.  ARTs 1 and 2 follow trivially.  In this context, a small
open economy is one whose substitution effects are negligible relative to
the world matrix S: SkS!1 is zero.  Ignoring tariffs in other countries, the
usual uniform reduction and concertina reform results follow as in
Section 1.  ARTs 3 and 4 also follow straightforwardly.  The only
qualification is that, to ensure a Pareto improvement with many countries,
the theorems must be stated in terms of the shadow premia (23).  Thus,
the uniform reduction result requires that all tariffs in a given country are
reduced in proportion to their shadow premia; and the concertina reform
result requires that (given substitutability) the tariff on the good with the
highest shadow premium rate (not the highest tariff rate) should be
reduced.
Finally, what about ART 5, the Ohyama-Kemp-Wan result?
Formally, this is just another corollary of Proposition 2: Pareto-improving
reforms of tariffs by all members of a customs union exist, provided their
external trade is kept fixed.  The interpretation is different because the
countries considered comprise only a subset of the world.  In ARTs 1 to
4, equation (20) held because there were no other countries in the world;
now it holds because the union’s common external tariff is adjusted as
necessary to ensure that its external trade does not change.  Note finally
that this version of the Ohyama-Kemp-Wan result is constructive in that
it characterises a sequence of internal tariff changes which ensure steady
Pareto improvements, rather than merely showing that the abolition of all
internal tariffs (given a fixed volume of external trade) is Pareto-
improving.  Proposition 2 thus extends the existing theory of tariff reform
in significant ways as well as encompassing all the earlier theorems.
3. SUBSIDIES TO HIGH-TECHNOLOGY FIRMS
The third substantive issue I wish to review is whether governments
should support export-oriented high-technology firms.  Since such firms
typically compete in oligopolistic industries, the tools to examine
problems such as this were not available until recently.  However, in the
14
past 15 years an explosion has taken place in the field of strategic trade
policy, applying the insights of modern industrial organisation theory to
open economies.  The result in my view has been a rich crop of novel
theoretical insights but as yet no robust recommendations for policy.  The
latter point has been made by a number of writers, yet the impression
persists that new and important guidelines for policy have been
developed.  Among the strong and not-so-strong claims which have been
made, let me single out three, which I label ‘QUARTs’ for ‘Questionable
Assertions Resembling a Theorem’:
QUART 1: (The Economist (1996)) Export subsidies should be
targeted towards firms in high-technology sectors.
QUART 2: (Brander (1995)) Subsidies to pre-competition variables
(such as investment or R&D) are a more robust
recommendation than subsidies to market-period
variables (output or price) because the former are more
likely to be strategic substitutes.
QUART 3: (The Economist (1996))  The strategic case for subsidies
is strengthened by R&D spillovers.
Once again, to put my claims in context I need to devote a little time to
an exposition of the theory.  I will concentrate on a canonical model, due
to Brander and Spencer (1985) which considers the case for subsidising
a single domestic firm which exports all its output (so domestic
consumption can be ignored) in competition with a single foreign rival.
3.1 The Optimal Export Subsidy in a One-Period Duopoly
QUART 1 resembles the basic result of Brander and Spencer (1985).
They showed that if the home and foreign firm engage in a one-shot
Cournot game, then an export subsidy is optimal.  This result has
subsequently been shown to be sensitive to a relaxation of many of the
model’s assumptions (a fact of which The Economist is clearly aware).
15
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W(a,b) ' p(a,b,s) & sa ' R(a,b) (25)
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(
ba da (27)
For example, if firms play a Bertrand price-setting game rather than a
Cournot quantity-setting game, then the result is reversed.  To see this,
consider a general setting where the firms choose an unspecified ‘action’,
which could be either output or price, a for the home firm and b for the
foreign firm.  (This specification follows Brander (1995).)  The home
firm’s profits equal its net revenue from production and sales, R(a,b), plus
the revenue it receives from a subsidy to its action at a rate s:
This specification encompasses both the Cournot case, where a and b are
home and foreign output, q and q*, respectively and output is subsidised;
and the Bertrand case, where a and b are home and foreign prices, p and
p*, respectively and price is subsidised.  (In Bertrand competition, a
subsidy to price has the same efficiency effects and so is equivalent to a
tax on the (differentiated) domestic good.)  Finally, the home government
is assumed to maximise domestic welfare which equals profits less subsidy
income:
The basic result is now easily obtained.  The home firm’s first-order
condition is:
A symmetric problem faced by the foreign firm leads to a similar
condition, though with no subsidy term, since I assume for simplicity that
the foreign government is passive: R*b =0.  The latter condition implicitly
defines the foreign firm’s reaction firm, which in differential form defines
a relationship between the actions of the two firms:
Here R*b b must be negative from the foreign firm’s second-order condition;
16
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and R*b a is negative if, and only if, the foreign firm’s action is a strategic
substitute for the home firm’s.
Now, totally differentiate the welfare function (25):
Setting this equal to zero and substituting from (26) and (27) gives the
solution for the optimal subsidy:
Recalling that the denominator R*b b is negative in all cases, the Brander-
Spencer result follows immediately.  In Cournot competition goods are
substitutes in (inverse) demand, so Rb is negative; and R*b a is negative in
the normal case where outputs are strategic substitutes.  Hence the left-
hand side is positive and the optimal policy is an export subsidy.  The
counter-result of Eaton and Grossman (1986) also drops out.  In Bertrand
competition, a and b are prices; Rb is positive assuming that the goods are
substitutes in demand; and R*b a is positive in the normal case where prices
are strategic complements.  Once again the left-hand side is positive, but
now this means that price should be subsidised, which is equivalent to an
export tax.
The rationale for government intervention is the same in both
Cournot and Bertrand cases.  The government is assumed to have the
power to commit credibly to a subsidy or tax which affects the
environment in which the two firms take their decisions.  Optimal policy
requires that the government exercise this power to do what the home firm
cannot credibly do alone: move the equilibrium to the one which would
prevail if the home firm had a first-mover Stackelberg advantage.
Staying with the Cournot case, is QUART 1 not a reasonable
restatement of the Brander-Spencer result?  I claim that it is not, for there
is nothing in the specification of the model which identifies the industry
as a high-technology one.  The existence of a duopolistic market structure
17
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requires only that barriers to entry are high.  While this may be true of the
rivalry between Airbus and Boeing, it is just as true of that between The
Economist and Time and Newsweek; between Unilever and Proctor and
Gamble in detergents; or between Bowater and Kimberly-Clark in paper
tissues.  Indeed, in the Brander-Spencer framework the only consideration
determining which firms within a group of oligopolistic industries should
be subsidised is which ones have the greatest potential for increasing their
profits at the expense of their foreign competitors.  (See Neary (1994).)
3.2 Optimal Subsidies to R&D
How might the model be extended to focus more specifically on high-
technology industries?  An obvious feature of such industries is that
production must be preceded by extensive investment in research and
product development.  This suggests that a two-period framework, in
which firms first make such investments and then compete in the product
market, should be more relevant to the high-technology case.  Following
Spencer and Brander (1983) and Neary and Leahy (1996), the model just
presented can be extended in this direction.
Suppose that in period 1 the home firm must incur fixed costs F(k)
which are increasing in the level of its spending on investment or R&D,
k.  The payoff to such spending is that it lowers production costs in period
2.  This is captured by including k as an argument in the period-2 revenue
function, with Rk>0.8  Finally, R&D spending benefits from a subsidy s .
Under these assumptions the firm’s profit function (24) becomes:
Now, assume that the home government and the two firms engage in a
subgame perfect three-stage game.  In the first stage the government
commits to the two subsidy rates; in the second stage the firms choose
their R&D levels; and in the third stage they choose their actions as
before.  To solve the model, we work backwards through the stages.  In
the final stage the firms play a static game just as in Section 3.1 above.
The home firm’s first-order condition is once again (26).  In the second
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stage the firms choose their optimal levels of R&D, taking account of their
effects on the third-stage game.  Thus the home firm’s choice of R&D
spending takes account both of its direct or ‘non-strategic’ effect on future
profitability as captured by pk; and also of its strategic effect in
influencing the environment in which the period-2 game is played.  The
first-order condition for R&D is therefore:
The term db/dk is the effect on the foreign firm’s action in the second
period which the home firm anticipates will result from an increase in its
R&D.  It is calculated by solving the two period-2 first-order conditions,
which is why it is specified as conditional on the foreign firm’s choice of
R&D, k*.
What is the government’s optimal policy in this case?  As before,
with no domestic consumption its welfare function equals profits less
subsidy payments:
Totally differentiating this and substituting from the home firm’s first-
order conditions gives:
The government’s problem is straightforward.  With two instruments at its
disposal (s  and s), it can be viewed as controlling the home firm’s choice
of k and a directly.  As for the foreign firm’s choice of b, it controls this
indirectly by moving the foreign firm along its reaction function.
However, unlike in the one-period model of Section 3.1, the relevant
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reaction function is the solution to both the foreign firm’s first-order
conditions, which are:
The government solves these conditions to obtain the foreign firm’s action
as a function of the home firm’s two actions:
Fortunately, since the two firms do not compete directly in the first
period, the effect of k on b is of second-order importance and may safely
be ignored.9   Substituting into (33) yields the optimal subsidies:
Except for the term Bk, which can be ignored, the optimal policies in (36)
exhibit a clear division of labour.  The period-2 subsidy serves to commit
the home firm to the Stackelberg choice of period-2 action, while the
R&D subsidy exactly offsets the strategic effect.  Moreover, the signs of
these two instruments display exactly the same ambiguity as in the static
game.  The period-2 export subsidy is positive or negative depending on
whether period-2 actions are strategic substitutes or complements, just as
in the static case.  As for the R&D subsidy, it has the opposite sign to that
of s.  When period-2 actions are strategic substitutes, the strategic effect
is positive.  In the terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), the home
firm adopts a ‘top dog’ strategy, over-investing to give itself an advantage
in the period-2 game.  The optimal policy is an R&D tax to ‘restrain’ the
firm.  By contrast, when period-2 actions are strategic complements, the
firm adopts a ‘puppy dog’ strategy of underinvestment.  For example, in
Bertrand competition, the firm has an incentive to reduce investment in
order to raise its rival’s price.  In this case the optimal policy is an R&D
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subsidy: the puppy dog should be ‘encouraged’.
The result for strategic substitutes was obtained by Spencer and
Brander (1983); that for strategic complements does not appear to have
been noted prior to Neary and Leahy (1996).  Taken together, these
results suggest that this branch of the theory of economic policy exhibits
an aesthetically pleasing unity, but they provide little comfort to policy
activism.  Contrary to the conjecture of Brander (1995) which I have
labelled QUART 2, the ambiguity which plagues the static theory of
strategic trade policy is magnified rather than reduced when dynamic
behaviour is incorporated.
3.3 R&D Spillovers and the Case for Industrial Policy
The final issue I want to address is the implications for strategic trade
policy of allowing R&D to have non-appropriable spillover effects, so
that it reduces the costs of firms other than those of the firm which
engages in it.  QUART 3 suggests that such spillovers strengthen the
strategic trade policy case for supporting innovating firms.  However,
Leahy and Neary (1996b) show that this inference is not valid.  Of course,
the presence of positive externalities in itself justifies a subsidy (assuming
that the private sector cannot internalise them in Coasian fashion).  But
this is an old argument, due to Pigou rather than to the theory of strategic
trade policy.  The relevant question is what additional basis for
intervention, if any, is provided by strategic considerations.
The answer turns out to be surprising.  When spillovers accrue to
firms in the same industry, a Cournot oligopolist has a strategic incentive
to reduce its output to reduce the technology transfer to its rivals.10  This
indeed provides a strategic motive for a government subsidy.  But note
that the subsidy should be provided even if the firms which benefit from
the spillovers are foreign!  The point of the subsidy is not to encourage
diffusion of new technology but to avoid inefficient underinvestment for
strategic reasons.  Of course, if the other firms are domestic, it is well
known that the strategic case for export subsidies is also weakened.
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What if the firms that benefit from the spillovers are domestic but
not in the same industry?  Now there is a pure Pigovian basis for
subsidising R&D.  But if competition is Cournot, then, from the previous
section, there is also a strategic motive for taxing R&D, to counteract the
‘top dog’ overinvestment behaviour already noted.  Thus, the exact type
of intervention which is justified is ambiguous and, at least in the Cournot
case, the additional strategic arguments work against rather than in favour
of R&D subsidies.
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this paper I have reviewed and extended some recent contributions to
three areas in the theory of international trade policy.  In each case, I have
used a simple canonical model to derive the main results in a compact
fashion and I have related this model to the principal results in the
literature.
In the case of tariff reform in a small open economy, I have drawn
attention to some results in the literature which are potentially misleading.
In particular, I take issue with suggestions that tariff increases in a small
open economy may be desirable.  I argue that such recommendations are
artifacts of models which do not include a numeraire good.  When a
numeraire good is included (which is equivalent to saying, when the
implications of linear homogeneity in prices are recognised) the case for
tariff increases ceases to hold.
Turning to the conditions for Pareto-improving tariff changes I have
suggested that a number of results in the literature can be seen as
equivalent.  A consequence of this perspective is that the same basic
principles of tariff reform apply in unilateral, multilateral and customs
union contexts.  Moreover, I have shown that the Ohyama-Kemp-Wan
theorem can be extended beyond an existence result and have shown how
the internal tariffs of a customs union can be adjusted to ensure Pareto
gains for the members, provided the union’s external trade is kept fixed.
Finally, I have reviewed the theory of strategic trade policy and
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shown that it does not provide a secure case for subsidies to high-
technology firms.  Indeed, the basic one-period result due to Brander and
Spencer merely justifies subsidies to firms in industries with high barriers
to entry.  These are just as likely to be technologically unsophisticated
incumbents in established markets as high-technology firms in growing
sectors.  The theory can be extended to allow for investments in R&D
prior to the competitive stage, thus more closely approximating the
conditions in high-technology industries.  But here too the ambiguity
which characterises the static theory persists: policies appropriate to firms
which compete on quantity are the opposite to those which should be
applied to price competitors.  Of course, R&D spillovers provide a clear-
cut justification for subsidising, though in this case too the optimal
subsidy may be reduced or even reversed by strategic considerations.  In
the light of recent research, the case for subsidising firms in high-
technology sectors is not particularly strong.
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1. The exposition which follows is based on Neary (1995).  For
extensions to economies with quotas as well as tariffs, see Falvey
(1988), Anderson and Neary (1992) and Neary (1995).
2. The full (n+1)-by-(n+1) matrix of substitution effects (including
those between the numeraire and other goods) is singular and so
only positive semi-definite.  Provided there is some substitutability
between the numeraire good and at least one other good, the n-by-n
matrix S will be positive definite and it is convenient to assume this
henceforward.
3. The inverse of this coefficient, (1!tNxI)!1, is known as the ‘tariff
multiplier’ or ‘shadow price of foreign exchange.’  See Smith (1982)
and Neary (1995) for details and references.
4. This is sometimes called the ‘Hatta Normality Term’ and is easily
seen to equal the left-hand side coefficient in (5):
p*NXI=(p!t )NXI=1!tNxI, using homogeneity and setting t0=0.
5. Their authors also join a distinguished group whose conclusions
have been criticised for failing to recognise the implications of
excluding a numeraire good.  See, for example, the criticisms of
Hotelling (1938) by Frisch (1939); of Dixit (1970) by Sandmo
(1974); and of Deaton (1979) by Stern (1986).
6. Though, if this is the case, they should be modelled explicitly.
Attempts to do this to date do not provide clear support for
increases in low tariffs.  See, for example, Falvey (1994) and
Anderson (1997).
7. Essentially the same result is obtained by Turunen-Red and
Woodland (1991) using Motzkin’s theorem of the alternative.
However, they do not interpret the shadow premia as deviations
from a weighted average and they do not note the general
ENDNOTES
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applicability of the result as I do here.
8. For example, R(k,a,b) might equal p.q!c(k).q, where p.q is sales
revenue and c(k) is marginal cost, independent of output and
decreasing in k.
9. The derivatives of R* in (35) do not depend on k.  Hence k can affect
b directly (ie for given a) only to the extent that changes in k affect
the slope of the home firm’s period-2 reaction function and hence
affect the term da/dk* in (35).  This effect vanishes, for example, in
the case of Cournot competition where marginal costs are
independent of output: see Spencer and Brander (1983) and Leahy
and Neary (1996a).
10. This incentive has been extensively studied in the closed economy
context.  See d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Leahy and
Neary (1997).
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